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Abstract 
 
 
This paper investigates the interrelationship between leverage and ownership 
concentration in the case of Norwegian non-listed firms while considering the 
effects of the 2006 Norwegian tax reform. This paper finds that the tax reform had 
a negative impact on leverage and a positive impact on ownership concentration. 
In addition, there is a bidirectional positive relationship between leverage and 
ownership concentration and the effect of leverage on ownership concentration is 
bigger than the effect of ownership concentration on leverage. The positive sign of 
this relationship can be explained through the role that the firm control may play 
in deciding the financing policy:  firms may prefer to issue debt instead of equity 
if issuing equity means sharing or losing control. Leverage is positively related 
with tangibility and firm size and negatively related with profitability. Ownership 
concentration is positively related with profitability and tangibility and negatively 
related with firm size.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to analyze the interrelationship between leverage and ownership 
concentration while taking into account the effects of the 2006 Norwegian tax 
reform. This study considers a sample of Norwegian non-listed firms which was 
extracted from the CCGR database at BI Norwegian Business School.  
 
Following the view of Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992), this paper considers that 
leverage and ownership concentration are “related both directly and indirectly 
through their relationship with the characteristics of firms”. Thus, leverage and 
ownership concentration are assumed to be endogenous variables while 
tangibility, profitability, firm size, growth opportunities and industry sector are 
assumed to be exogenous variables. Although their findings concluded that the 
leverage, dividend and insider ownership policies are interdependent, this paper 
focuses only on the leverage and ownership policies because the dividend policy 
has been thoroughly studied before.  
 
Since the tax reform was announced in advance and some transitionary rules were 
implemented even from 2004, the reactions of the firms were observed starting 
with 2005: leverage decreased while ownership concentration increased.  
 
The decrease in leverage can be explained by the fact that since the cost of 
dividends increased, shareholders decided to retain earnings rather than distribute 
them as dividends. This led to an increase in equity and consequently a decrease 
in leverage. 
 
The increase in ownership concentration can be explained by the fact that the tax 
reform abolished the split model (delingsmodell) which involved an additional tax 
for the firms with active shareholders owning more than 2/3 of the firm.  
 
This paper is structured as follows: chapter 2 presents a review of the capital 
structure literature, chapter 3 describes the 1992 and 2006 Norwegian tax reforms, 
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chapter 4 presents information about the samples and the variables used, as well 
as descriptive statistics, chapter 5 presents the research methodology and its 
results while chapter 6 presents the conclusion of this paper. 
  
2. Literature review 
 
The modern theory of capital structure started with the famous article of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Assuming perfect capital markets, Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) demonstrated that in the absence of bankruptcy costs and tax 
subsidies on interest payments, the market value of the firm is independent of its 
capital structure. They later (1963) showed that the existence of tax subsidies on 
interest payments would increase the total value of the firm by an amount equal 
with the market value of debt times the corporate tax rate. Since the firm value 
increases with the amount of debt, the firm should theoretically use as much debt 
finance as possible.  However, in the real world, firms do not use 100% debt 
finance because of the cost of financial distress. Therefore, the leverage lowers tax 
payments and increases the cost of equity as a result of the cost of financial 
distress.    
 
Following the categories of determinants of capital structure identified by Harris 
and Raviv (1991), this chapter will be divided in three parts: agency theory 
(models based on agency costs), pecking order theory (models using asymmetric 
information) and trade-off theory. 
 2.1 Agency theory 
 
The agency theory of capital structure states that the “capital structure is 
determined by agency costs, meaning costs due to conflicts of interest” (Harris 
and Raviv 1991). It was first suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) building 
on earlier work of Fama and Miller (1972).  
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Jensen and Meckling analyzed the agency costs generated by two types of 
conflicts of interest: conflicts between the shareholders and managers and 
conflicts between shareholders and debtholders. They believe that the existence of 
agency costs provides stronger reasons for arguing that “the probability 
distribution of future cash flows is not independent of the capital structure”.  
 
Conflicts between shareholders and managers arise because managers “do not 
capture the entire gain from their profit enhancement activities, but they do bear 
the entire cost of these activities” (Harris and Raviv 1991). The agency costs 
generated by this type of conflict are defined as the sum of: the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal (shareholders), the bonding expenditures by the 
agent (managers) and the residual loss. 
 
Let’s consider a company that is 100% owned by the manager. If some potentially 
profitable investment opportunities appear and he does not have enough wealth in 
order to exploit them, he must obtain outside financing. This means that he will 
reduce his ownership in the company while also incurring agency costs generated 
by the conflict between him and the new shareholders. The lower his ownership 
fraction, the lower is his incentive to devote significant effort to profit 
enhancement activities, but the larger are the agency costs he incurs. Because the 
agency costs are borne entirely by the original owner (manager), he has the 
incentive to minimize them. However, if the investments requiring outside 
financing are sufficiently profitable, his welfare will continue to increase despite 
the agency costs he incurs (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
Therefore, the agency conflict between the owner-manager and the outside 
shareholders derives from “the manager’s tendency to appropriate perquisites out 
of the company’s resources for his own consumption” (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). The appropriation of perquisites can be limited if the manager holds a high 
equity stake in the company because his objective is aligned with those of the 
shareholders. This type of conflict can also be mitigated by debt financing 
because “increasing debt reduces the amount of free cash available to managers to 
GRA 19003 Master Thesis                                                                       03.09.2012 
 
Page 4 
 
consume perquisites while increases the manager’s share of the equity” (Harris 
and Raviv 1991). 
 
Conflicts between shareholders and debtholders arise because “the debt contract 
gives shareholders an incentive to invest in very risky projects even if they have 
negative NPV” so that debtholders bear most of the consequences in case the 
investment fails while shareholders capture most of the gains in case the 
investment succeeds. However, the shareholders bear the cost of this incentive if 
the debtholders correctly anticipate their future behavior. This is an agency cost of 
debt financing called the “asset substitution effect” (Harris and Raviv 1991).  
 
The tax subsidy on interest payments provides an incentive to use debt to the point 
where the marginal wealth benefits of the tax subsidy are just equal to the 
marginal wealth effects of the agency costs associated with debt (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). 
However, debt doesn’t completely dominate the firms’ capital structures because 
of the agency costs associated with the existence of debt claims on the firms. The 
agency costs of debt consist of: the incentive effects associated with highly 
leveraged companies (asset substitution effect), the monitoring and bonding costs 
by the bondholders and the owner-manager, the bankruptcy and reorganization 
costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
 
Therefore, Jensen and Meckling state that the optimal capital structure can be 
obtained by trading off the agency costs of debt against the benefits of debt. This 
view is also shared by Stulz (1990) who also analyzes the conflicts between 
shareholders and managers.  
 
In a world with asymmetric information and where managers value investment 
more than shareholders do, the extent to which managers are able to pursue their 
own self-interest leads to the creation of two agency costs: the overinvestment 
cost (managers invest too much so that the firm invests even in negative NPV 
projects) and the underinvestment cost (managers invest too little so that the firm 
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does not take advantage of all the positive NPV investment opportunities) (Stulz 
1990). 
 
Stulz’s analysis shows that the firm’s debt-equity ratio depends on the probability 
distribution of cash flow and on the firm’s investment opportunities. 
If a firm has negative expected FCF and poor investment opportunities, the 
shareholders may want the firm to issue debt so that the management is forced to 
pay out the firm’s debt obligations and therefore reduce the amount of FCF 
available for investments. This reduces the overinvestment cost, but increases the 
underinvestment cost. 
If a firm has positive expected FCF and good investment opportunities, the 
shareholders may want the firm to raise more funds by issuing equity in order to 
take advantage of all the positive NPV investment opportunities. This reduces the 
underinvestment cost, but increases the overinvestment cost. 
Therefore, by influencing the amount of resources under management’s control, 
financing policy can reduce one of these agency costs, but not both (Stulz 1990). 
 
Fluck (1999) also analyzes the distribution of equity ownership between 
entrenched insiders (management) and dispersed outsiders when the management 
has the ability to manipulate cash flows and when the agency costs for the 
shareholders are big. When the ownership is dispersed, control challenges may 
succeed after repeated attempts and then the real cost of capital influences the 
shareholders’ willingness to discipline management. 
 
If the real cost of capital is low (shareholders are long-term oriented), the 
shareholders are willing to control management no matter the amount of the 
agency costs nor the time spent so that management tends to reduce its equity 
stake in the company by selling shares to dispersed outsiders. Because the 
probability of success does not affect the threat of control, the concentration of 
outside equity does not lead to improved managerial performance (Fluck 1999). 
 
If the real cost of capital is high  (shareholders are short-term oriented), the  
shareholders are less willing to control management if it is costly in the short run 
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so that management tends to increase its equity stake in the company. In this case, 
the probability of success increases the threat of control so that the concentration 
of outside equity leads to improved managerial performance and increased 
dividends (Fluck 1999). In addition, Fluck’s analysis also shows that management 
is more likely to purchase shares in companies with dispersed outside ownership 
than in companies with concentrated outside ownership.   
 
2.2 Pecking order theory 
 
First proposed by Donaldson (1961) and later modified by Myers and Majluf 
(1984), the pecking order theory states that “capital structure will be driven by 
firms’ desire to finance new investments, first internally, then with low-risk debt, 
and finally with equity only as a last resort”. (Harris and Raviv 1991) 
 
In a world without taxes, transaction costs or other capital market imperfections, 
Myers and Majluf developed an equilibrium model of the issue-invest decision 
which has the following assumptions: 
• Asymmetric information which means that management knows more 
about the firm’s value than potential investors. 
• Management’s objective is to act in the interest of passive, old 
stockholders (meaning to maximize the true or intrinsic value of the 
existing shares).  
 
While from the first assumption it can be inferred that the potential investors 
(outsiders) need to analyze the managers’ signals in order to figure out the firm 
value, from the second assumption it can be inferred that managers tend to issue 
equity when it is overvalued which implies that new issues will be interpreted as 
bad news and lead to the price decline of the existing shares. In addition, “the 
price drop will be larger, the larger is the informational asymmetry and the larger 
is the equity issue”. On the other hand, “financing through internal funds or 
riskless debt will not convey information and will not result in any stock price 
reaction” (Harris and Raviv 1991). Therefore, external funds are more expensive 
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than internal funds. In conclusion, this model explains the companies’ tendency to 
rely on internal sources of funds and to prefer debt to equity if external financing 
is required (Myers and Majluf 1984).  
 
The authors use the concept of “financial slack” which means “cash, liquid assets 
or unused borrowing power” instead of internal sources of funds. They emphasize 
that “ample financial slack allows the company to avoid external financing and to 
disentangle investment decisions from conflicts of interest between old 
stockholders and new investors”. Financial slack has value because a company 
with insufficient financial slack may not undertake all valuable investment 
opportunities as it may be unwillingly to issue stock to finance them (Myers and 
Majluf 1984).  
 
In addition, the pecking order theory supports the negative relation between 
profitability and leverage. Considering the suggested financing sequence, a 
profitable company may have sufficient internal sources of funds to rely on so that 
it does not need to choose debt financing which is the next in line financing 
source. As a consequence, profitable companies may end up by having low 
leverage. On the other hand, less profitable companies may be forced to choose 
debt financing in case they do not have sufficient internal sources of funds. 
 
2.3 Trade‐off theory 
 
Modigliani and Miller have shown that in complete and perfect capital markets 
the firm’s market value is independent of its capital structure. Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973) analyzed the effect of leverage on the firm’s market value by 
introducing the following market imperfections: taxation of corporate profits and 
the existence of bankruptcy penalties into a single-period valuation model in a 
complete capital market. According to the authors, the optimization of the firm’s 
capital structure involves “a tradeoff between the benefits of tax deductibility of 
interest rate costs and the bankruptcy penalties”.  
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3. Norwegian tax reforms 
3.1 Tax bases 
 
The Norwegian income tax system operates with two income tax bases: ordinary 
income and personal income. 
 
Ordinary income (alminnelig inntekt) is a net income tax base and it is 
calculated for all taxpayers, both companies and individuals. It includes all 
taxable income from work, business and capital. Tax allowances and 
reliefs are deductible in the computation of ordinary income. The most 
important of these are interest payments on debts and a basic tax 
allowance on wage and pension income. The latter does not, however, 
apply to wage income from self-employment. In addition to the basic tax 
allowance, travel expenses to and from work exceeding NOK 12800, trade 
union fees, gifts to voluntary organizations, documented expenses for 
child care etc. are deductible. (Ministry of Finance, The personal tax code)  
 
Personal income (personinntekt) is a gross income tax base which consists 
of the total amount of gross wage and pension income. Social security 
contributions and surtax are levied on personal income. Wage income is a 
broad term that is defined as the sum of wages, income from self-
employment that is related to labor input and fringe benefits such as 
company cars, free phone, free stock options etc. In general, all kinds of 
fringe benefits are regarded as personal income. (Ministry of Finance, The 
personal tax code) 
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3.2 1992 Tax Reform 
 
In 1992 Norway implemented a broad tax reform whose main goal was to reduce 
tax-induced distortions to a minimum by lowering the tax rates and broadening 
the tax base. The reform also involved a significant step towards a more neutral 
tax system with respect to the type of economic activity and the organizational 
and financial structure of such activity. (Ministry of Finance) 
 
The dual income tax introduced in 1992 was characterized by a low and flat tax 
rate on capital income and a progressive tax rate on personal income. The basic 
idea was to imply a neutral taxation on capital income and to ensure the 
redistribution of income through the progressive taxation of personal income and 
net wealth. The capital income earned by personal tax payers (as well as the one 
earned by corporate tax payers) was subject to a flat tax rate of 28 per cent. The 
difference in marginal tax rates on capital and labor income (including employers’ 
social security contributions) started out at 28.1 percentage points in 1992, 
increasing to 36.7 percentage points in 2004. 
 
The split model was to function as a bridge between these two parts of the tax 
system, by dividing the income from active owners and self employed into capital 
and labor income respectively. This split model implied that a part of the income 
earned by companies owned two-thirds or more by active shareholders, was taxed 
as personal income (which was subject to progressive tax rates), irrespective of 
whether this income was distributed as a dividend or not. However, since the 1992 
reform, the split model has been changed several times with the result that it no 
longer functioned in a satisfactory manner. 
 
To avoid double taxation, shareholders receiving dividends from Norwegian 
limited companies, were entitled to full credit for tax imposed on the dividends 
(the imputation method). Consequently dividends from Norwegian companies 
were in practice tax free on the hands of the shareholder, ensuring the same total 
taxation of 28 percent upon income earned in a limited company as on other 
capital income. On receiving dividend from a foreign limited company, a personal 
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shareholder was not entitled to a full imputation credit, only a tax credit in respect 
of foreign withholding tax. 
 
The 1992 tax reform also introduced a system of annual adjustment of the cost 
base of the shares in Norwegian companies with the amount of retained taxed 
profit in the company, to avoid economic double taxation of retained earnings, 
called the RISK-system.  
 
3.3 2006 Tax Reform 
 
The Norwegian Parliament passed a major tax reform in 2006 which replaced the 
last major Norwegian tax reform from 1992. The main objective of the 2006 tax 
reform was to achieve a more efficient and fair tax system by solving the income 
shifting problem created by the large gap between labor and capital income 
taxation without violating the economic principles of the dual income tax. The 
maximum rate differential between capital income and labor income was 33.5 
percentage points in 2005 and this led the owners of small companies to paying 
their salaries as dividends by reclassifying labor income as capital income. 
(Ministry of Finance 2005) 
 
The challenge of the 2006 reform was to eliminate the gap in the marginal tax 
rates and abolish the split model without violating the tax neutrality of financing 
decisions, and without increasing the corporate income tax. The only realistic way 
to reduce the gap in the marginal tax rates was to combine a reduction in the 
marginal tax rates on labor with an introduction of a partial double taxation of 
dividends paid to individual shareholders (by eliminating the former imputation 
system). To maintain neutrality, the dividend tax was equipped with an allowance 
for the cost of capital (as well as ordinary loss deductions), the so called 
shareholder model. The same principle was introduced in the taxation of sole 
proprietors and partnerships. (Ministry of Finance 2011) 
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The main element of the 2006 tax reform was to replace the split model and the 
imputation system with the shareholder model. 
Norwegian Individual Shareholders are taxable for capital gains on the realization 
of shares and have a corresponding right to deduct losses. Capital gains are taxed 
as ordinary income with a flat tax rate of 28%. Also, the dividends exceeding a 
risk-free return on the investment are taxed as ordinary income with a flat tax rate 
of 28%. Before the dividends distribution, the company has paid the ordinary 28% 
corporate tax on the operating profits, so the total maximum marginal tax rate is 
therefore 48.16 % (28% + (72 x 28%)) for distributed dividends. As a 
consequence, the gap between labor and capital income has been reduced as the 
income derived from labor and pensions is taxed progressively as personal income 
up to maximum 47.8% on salary. (Albert 2008)  
 
Thus, the dividends that are not exceeding a risk-free return on the investment are 
subject only to the 28% corporate tax on the operating profits. If the dividends for 
one year are less than the calculated risk-free return on investment, the surplus tax 
free amount can be carried forward in order to be offset against dividends 
distributed in a later year or against any capital gain from the alienation of the 
same share. This risk-free return allowance was intended to prevent tax on 
dividends from raising the costs of funding Norwegian equity and it was regarded 
as particularly important for start-ups and small companies that cannot fund new 
investment with retained profits, or which have limited access to credit markets or 
international capital markets. (Report No. 11 to the Storting) 
 
Norwegian Corporate Shareholders are not subject to tax on dividends and on 
capital gains derived from realization of shares in companies which are resident 
within the EEA, while losses suffered from such realization are not tax deductible. 
This method can be also applicable to investments in foreign countries outside the 
EEA only if the corporate shareholder holds at least 10% of the shares and voting 
rights for at least 2 years. (Albert 2008) As a consequence, the tax system has 
built in an important incentive when it comes to the type of business entity to 
choose. Therefore, an increased number of limited companies have been 
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established by private investors for the purpose of buying and selling shares 
without taxation through their private limited company.  
 
In addition, the general tax treatment of interest income is that the lender is 
taxable for the received interests with a flat tax rate of 28 %, and the paid interests 
are deductible in ordinary income with the same amount for the borrower. But if 
an individual shareholder lends money to a limited company an additional tax is 
levied, more specifically another 28% on 72% of the received interest will be 
charged for tax purposes. The reason for this deduction of 28% is symmetry 
considerations towards tax on retained earnings. This means that interests received 
from a limited company are taxed with a total of 48.16% for amounts exceeding a 
risk-free return and the same as for distributed earnings. (Albert 2008) This 
additional tax charge comes as an addition to the ordinary taxation of the interest 
and thus 172% of the relevant part of the interest is taxed. (KPMG Tax Facts 
2006) Appendix 1 presents a comparison between the two major tax reforms. 
 
4. Data 
 
4.1 Data sources and samples 
  
The CCGR database was constructed by Pål Rydland from data delivered by 
CreditInform which specializes in credit ratings and buys data from the state 
agency (Brønnøysundregistrene). This database is extremely reliable because 
every limited liability company registered in Norway is legally obliged to publish 
the identity of its CEO, directors, owners and the fraction of equity held by every 
owner as well as to submit an annual report to the state agency each year. 
The annual report consists of a profit and loss statement, a balance sheet, 
accompanying footnotes, a cash flow statement, the board of directors’ report and 
the auditor’s report.   
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The CCGR database covers the period 1994-2009 for accounting information and 
general firm information, whereas data on governance, founding year, auditor 
remarks, and credit ratings is available only for the period 2000-2009. It has about 
240 items per firm per year across the accounting, governance and misc. 
categories and about 126 additional items reserved for consolidating accounting 
data.  
 
When the sample data was extracted from the CCGR database, there have been 
applied some filters which select independent private firms with limited liability 
that have a positive number of employees and whose largest owner is not the state 
or international. The aim of the independency filter was to exclude the companies 
that were established with the purpose of avoiding taxes. Thus, the initial sample 
had a total number of 960159 observations across the time period 2000-2009.  It 
represents a panel data since multiple firms are observed at multiple time periods. 
 
In order to create a highly accurate sample, more filters were further applied. 
Firstly, 550211 observations remained in the sample after the firms that have 
negative or zero accounting statement items (for example: revenue, assets, 
dividends, liabilities, equity) were excluded. Secondly, after applying a filter 
which selects the firms that have the sum % of equity held by owner with rank 1 
below and equal to 100% or the Herfindahl index below and equal to 1, the final 
data sample had a total number of 550093 observations across the time period 
2000-2009. This final data sample will be further called Sample 1. 
 
In order to conduct the desired tests, two new samples were created: Sample 2 and 
Sample 3. Although this may involve survival bias, Sample 2 includes only the 
firms which are present along the whole sample period meaning from 2000 to 
2009 and Sample 3 includes only the firms which are present from 2000 to 2005. 
Thus, Sample 2 has a total of 136060 observations meaning 13606 firms observed 
during 10 years and Sample 3 has a total of 143394 observations meaning 23899 
firms observed during 6 years. Sample 2 will be used for some additional tests 
performed in chapter 4 and for the first and third econometrical model, while 
sample 3 will be used for the second econometrical model.  
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4.2 Definitions of variables  
 
The variables obtained from the CCGR database are presented in Appendix 2. 
Further on follows a description of the variables defined in this paper together 
with a motivation for the measures used for each variable. 
 
Leverage 
Leverage is measured by using the most common definition in previous research 
according to Frank and Goyal (2009):  
Leverage= Total Debt/ Total Assets 
Where: 
Total Debt = current liabilities (item_109) + bonds + liabilities to financial 
institutions (long) + other long term liabilities (item_93_94_98) 
Total Assets = Total Debt + Total equity (item_87)  
 
Two traditional determinants of capital structure are: assets tangibility and firm 
size. 
 
Tangibility 
According to Harris and Raviv (1991), the available studies generally agree that 
leverage is positively related to fixed assets. Frank and Goyal (2009) also indicate 
that the tradeoff theory suggests that “a firm with more assets can pledge them in 
support of debt” while the pecking order theory “can predict both a negative and 
positive relation to leverage depending on the type of economic forces for which 
the collateral is viewed as a proxy”. 
Assets tangibility is a proxy for collateral value so that the greater the collateral 
value of a firm’s assets, the more value the debtholder can recover in case of 
default (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
Tangibility = Fixed assets (item_51) / Total assets 
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Firm size 
Firm size can be measured either as logarithm of sales or logarithm of assets. 
According to Frank and Goyal (2009), leverage is positively related to firm size as 
measured by log of sales. In addition, they state that “empirically log of sales is a 
better measure of firm size than is log of assets”. 
According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), ownership concentration is negatively 
related to firm size as “larger firms realize a lower overall cost with a more diffuse 
ownership structure than do small firms”.  
Thus Firm size = ln (sales). Sales are represented by item_9.  
  
Profitability 
According to the pecking order theory, leverage is negatively related to 
profitability because a profitable company has enough internal funds so that it 
does not need to rely on debt. However, under the tradeoff theory discussed by 
Fama and French (2002), leverage is positively related to profitability.  
According to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), there is a negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and profitability. Ownership concentration may 
decrease as outside investors start to be interested in companies that have good 
results of operations. 
Profitability = Results of operations (item_19) / Total assets 
 
Growth opportunities 
Usually high growth opportunities are specific to firms found at the beginning of 
their life-cycle. Since ownership concentration is high for these type of firms, it is 
predicted a positive relation between growth opportunities and ownership 
concentration. Because the sample includes only non-listed firms, growth 
opportunities are measured by Revenue/ Total assets.  
Growth opportunities = Revenue (item_9) / Total assets 
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Time 
Time is a dummy variable which records the effect of the 2006 Norwegian tax 
reform. It takes 1 if the firm observation is done after the tax reform and 0 
otherwise. The observations belonging to the period 2005-2009 are considered 
after the tax reform. 
 
Industry 
According to Frank and Goyal (2009), industry effects should be considered when 
analyzing leverage since firms in a high leverage industry have higher leverage. 
This is also supported by the tradeoff theory which suggests that firms in the same 
industry face many common factors.  
 
Since the considered period is from 2000 to 2009 and the NAIC industry codes 
changed in 2007, the new codes were transformed according to the old 
classification in order to have the same industry code classification across the 
sample. Then, the NAIC industry codes were used to classify the companies into 
industries according to the classification presented in Appendix 3. In order to 
avoid the dummy variable trap, 9 industry dummies will be used in order to 
classify the companies into 9 industry sectors while keeping 0 as the reference 
group for the companies that were not assigned any industry (Berzins, Bøhren and 
Rydland 2008). An industry dummy 9 records all the observations that have more 
than one industry assigned. The table below shows the distribution of firms across 
the industry sectors. 
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Industry 
dummies 
Sector name Nb. of firms Percentages 
Reference group Missing  30730 5.6 
IND1 Agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, 
mining  
10416 1.9 
IND 2 Manufacturing, 
chemical products 
44985 8.2 
IND 3 Energy  2261 .4 
IND 4 Construction  54127 9.8 
IND 5 Service  240716 43.8 
IND 6 Financial 5408 1.0 
IND 7 Trade  94821 17.2 
IND 8 Transport  46001 8.4 
IND 9 Multisector  20628 3.7 
Total 550093 100 
 
Ownership concentration  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) consider that the shareholders of a firm which has a 
concentrated ownership structure may prefer less debt if debt brings more 
monitoring. Therefore ownership concentration is expected to be negatively 
related with leverage so that the higher is the ownership concentration, the lower 
is the leverage.  
 
The ownership concentration is measured by using variables based on ultimate 
(all-layers) ownership instead of direct (first-layer) ownership. La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) were the first to introduce the concept of ultimate 
ownership which is the sum of direct and indirect equity holdings in a company 
held by the ultimate owner. The variable used to measure the ownership 
concentration is the sum % of equity held by the owner with rank 1. 
OwnershipConc = Sum % of equity held by owner with rank 1 / 100 
 
Firm control can play an important role in establishing the effect of ownership 
concentration on leverage. According to Céspedes, González and Molina (2010), 
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firms may prefer to issue debt instead of equity if issuing equity means sharing or 
losing control.  
 
Consider a first example in which a firm has a 60% majority shareholder and a 
40% minority shareholder and the second example in which a firm has a 60% 
majority shareholder and 5 minority shareholders each holding 8% of the firm. If 
the firm from the first example decides to issue equity, then the majority 
shareholder may lose the control of the firm and therefore he may prefer to issue 
debt. However, the majority shareholder from the second example does not lose 
the control of the firm if the firm decides to issue equity. 
Therefore, the firm’s incentive to issue debt instead of equity when the majority 
shareholder can lose the firm control in favor of minority shareholders can explain 
a  positive relationship between ownership concentration and leverage. 
 
Herfindahl index 
According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), the Herfindahl index of the firm’s 
ownership structure is calculated as the sum of the squares of the equity fractions 
held by each shareholder in the firm. It reflects both the average size of the equity 
fractions and the inequality of equity fractions between shareholders. High levels 
of the Herfindahl index indicate high ownership concentration.  Since leverage is 
negatively related to ownership concentration, it can be concluded that the higher 
is the Herfindahl index, the lower is the leverage. The Herfindahl index is used as 
an instrumental variable for the 2SLS approach. 
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4.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Firstly, there are presented the most important descriptive statistics (mean, 
median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum) for the main dependent 
variables: Leverage and Ownership concentration as well as for the Herfindahl 
index variable (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the main dependent variables and Herfindahl (Sample 1) 
 
 Leverage OwnershipConc Herfindahl index 
N 550093 550093 550093 
Mean .685882 .697419 .654692 
Median .752427 .660000 .545000 
Std. Deviation .2371081 .2754877 .3016452 
Minimum .0000 .0000 .0000 
Maximum 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
The average leverage in the sample is quite high (68.58%). The average 
ownership concentration proxied by the fraction of equity held by owner with 
rank 1 (OwnershipConc) is also high 69.74%. Both averages are expected to be 
high because these are the typical features of non-listed firms. The Herfindahl 
index takes into account all the equity fractions held by all the shareholders in the 
firm so that its average (65.46%) is smaller than the OwnershipConc average. 
 
Secondly, the Pearson’s Correlation matrix shows that leverage and ownership 
concentration (OwnershipConc) are negatively correlated (Table 2).  This finding 
is consistent with the theory suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
 
Table 2: Pearson’s Correlation matrix (Sample 1) 
 Leverage OwnershipConc 
Leverage Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
1 -.037**
.000
OwnershipConc Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.037** 
.000 
1
**Significant at 0.01%  level. 
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In order to take account of the 2006 Norwegian tax reform, I divided Sample 1 in 
two samples: before the tax reform (2000-2004) and after the tax reform (2005-
2009). Year 2005 belongs to the after the tax reform sample because the effects of 
the reform were noticed since 2005. Thus it has been created the dummy variable 
Time which takes the value 0 if the observation’s year belongs to 2000-2004 and 
the value 1 if the observation’s year belongs to 2005-2009. Table 3 shows the 
descriptive statistics for the before and after the tax reform samples including also 
the independent sample t tests for the means. Nonparametric independent samples 
median tests were also conducted.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the before and after the tax reform sample 
 Leverage OwnershipConc Herfindahl 
 Before After Before After Before After 
N 267419 282674 267419 282674 267419 282674 
Mean .728524 .645541 .677727 .716047 .630634 .677453 
Median .802682 .697702 .645500 .700000 .520000 .557800 
Std.Deviation .219668 .245782 .269957 .279345 .295225 .305858 
Minimum .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Maximum 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
T test  
(for mean) 
132.177** -51.738** -57.768** 
**Significant at 0.01% level. 
 
It can be noticed that the average leverage decreased from 72.85% in the before 
the tax reform sample to 64.55% in the after the tax reform sample. An unequal 
variances t test revealed that the firms’ mean leverage before the tax reform was 
significantly different from the firms’ mean leverage after the tax reform. Thus, it 
can be inferred that the tax reform influenced leverage.   
 
In addition, the average ownership concentration (OwnershipConc) increased 
from 67.77% in the before the tax reform sample to 71.60% in the after the tax 
reform sample. An unequal variances t test revealed that the average ownership 
concentration before the tax reform was significantly different from the average 
ownership concentration after the tax reform. Thus, it can be inferred that the tax 
reform influenced ownership concentration. The same conclusion is reached even 
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if the Herfindahl index is used as a proxy for ownership concentration because the 
difference between the means is still statistically significant. 
  
Nonparametric independent samples median tests were performed for all the three 
variables: Leverage, OwnershipConc and Herfindahl. The tests showed that the 
medians before and after the tax reform for all the above mentioned variables are 
significantly different.  
 
Moreover, there have been computed the correlations between Leverage and 
OwnershipConc variables before and after the tax reform (Table 4). It can be 
noticed that the correlation between leverage and ownership concentration 
changes signs: from positive before the tax reform to negative after the tax reform. 
Nevertheless, if the whole Sample 1 is considered, the correlation is negative.  
 
Table 4: Pearson’s Correlation matrix before and after the tax reform 
Leverage OwnershipConc  
Before After Before  After 
 Leverage 1 1 0.024 -0.065 
OwnershipConc 0.024 -0.065 1 1 
*All the correlations are significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
However, the results of the previous independent samples tests (for the mean and 
median) may have not been so accurate because the tests assumed that the 
observations belong to different firms while in reality Sample 1 includes also 
observations that belong to the same firm but at different points in time. Thus, 
Sample 2 was used for conducting paired-samples t tests for the means as well as 
nonparametric related samples median tests (Table 5). 
 
From the paired-samples t tests for the means it can be concluded that there was a 
significant decrease in the average leverage from the before the reform period 
(mean=73.16%) to the after the reform period (mean=62.86%). The eta squared 
statistic (0.2713) indicates a large effect size.  
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There was also a significant increase in the average ownership concentration from 
the before the reform period (mean=66.73%) to the after the reform period 
(mean=69.79%). The eta squared statistic (0.0468) indicates a moderate-small 
effect size.   
 
Table 5: Paired samples statistics and test for the means (Sample 2) 
 Mean Mean 
difference 
T test Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Eta 
square
d 
.731686 
 
LeverageBeforeReform 
– 
LeverageAfterReform .628616 
 
.1030699 
 
71.172 
 
.000** 
 
0.2713 
.667398 OwnershipConcBefore
Reform –  
OwnershipConcAfter 
Reform 
.697916 
-.0305175 -25.865 .000** 0.0468 
**Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
In addition, the nonparametric related samples tests (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test) 
showed that the medians before and after the tax reform for both leverage and 
ownership concentration are significantly different. 
  
Table 6 shows the average values of leverage and ownership concentration for the 
whole period 2000-2009 (Sample 1). 
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Table 6: The mean  leverage and ownership concentration grouped by year (Sample 1) 
Year 
Nb. of  
observations 
Mean   
Leverage 
Mean  
OwnershipConc 
Mean  
Herfindahl 
2000 52022 .687755 .684355 .636608 
2001 52124 .706320 .675971 .628194 
2002 52545 .734681 .672740 .625272 
2003 54603 .739915 .676380 .629623 
2004 56125 .770089 .679196 .633365 
2005 56997 .691776 .700047 .657925 
2006 54505 .663501 .722786 .681372 
2007 57617 .643395 .714196 .676117 
2008 56440 .623704 .720110 .684026 
2009 57115 .606008 .723437 .688052 
 
According to Alstadsæter and Fjærli (2009), the tax reform caused the leverage 
levels of small and closely held firms to increase during the years prior to the 
reform (2001-2004) and then to decrease during the years after the reform (2005-
2009). The same result is also noticed from Sample 1: the average leverage had an 
increasing trend until 2004, but then it suffered a sudden decrease in 2005 which 
continued until 2009. Thus, average leverage decreased from 77% in 2004 to 
69.17% in 2005 and then to 60.60% in 2009. 
 
Considering the ownership concentration variable proxied by OwnershipConc, it 
can be noticed that the average ownership concentration had a decreasing trend 
until 2002 which was followed by a very small increase until 2004 and then a big 
increase in 2005. Thus, average ownership concentration increased from 67.91% 
in 2004 to 70% in 2005. Then it basically continued to increase with the exception 
of 2007 so that it reached 72.34% in 2009. 
Considering the ownership concentration variable proxied by the Herfindahl 
index, it can be noticed that it followed the same trend as the one proxied by 
OwnershipConc. Thus, average ownership concentration increased from 63.33% 
in 2004 to 65.79% in 2005 and then to 68.80% in 2009. 
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5. Methodology approach and results 
 
This paper aims to analyze the interrelationship between leverage and ownership 
concentration which are considered to be related both directly and indirectly 
through their relationship with the characteristics of each firm. Thus, this paper 
follows the view of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who supported the hypothesis of 
endogenous ownership structure as well as the view of Jensen, Solberg and Zorn 
(1992) who considered that the decisions regarding leverage and insider 
ownership are interdependent. 
 
The descriptive statistics and the additional tests performed in the previous 
chapter showed that the 2006 Norwegian tax reform had a significant effect on the 
leverage and ownership concentration variables. However, there are also many 
other factors (firm characteristics) that may have influenced the changes in 
leverage and ownership concentration. 
 
In order to further examine the relationship between leverage and ownership 
concentration, three econometrical models will be defined. Each econometrical 
model consists of a simultaneous equations system with two structural equations. 
This approach “allows for the interdependence of firm decisions, while controlling 
for the effects that the other firm characteristics may have on these decisions” 
(Jensen, Solberg and Zorn 1992). Since the application of OLS to these 
simultaneous equations systems will lead to biased coefficient estimates, the two 
stage least squares (2SLS) approach will be used.  
 
According to Brooks (2008, 277), the 2SLS method is done in two stages: 
“Stage 1: Estimate the reduced form equations (endogenous variables are written 
in terms of exogenous variables) by using OLS and obtain the fitted values for the 
endogenous variables. 
Stage 2: Estimate the structural equations using OLS, but replace any RHS 
endogenous variables with their stage 1 fitted values.” 
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Thus, the goal of the 2SLS method is to provide better estimates of the regression 
coefficients when the explanatory endogenous variable is correlated with the error 
term. Since R-squared has no statistical meaning in the context of 2SLS 
(http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/statistics/two-stage-least-squares/), the model 
fit output will not be analyzed. 
5.1 First econometrical model 
 
The first econometrical model takes a long-term perspective and assesses the 
impact of the average firm characteristics before the reform on the average 
leverage and average ownership concentration after the reform. This model uses 
cross-sectional variables where each of the 13606 cross sections corresponds to a 
firm from Sample 2. The results for this econometrical model are shown in Table 
7 and Table 8. (Appendix 4) 
 
 = α + β1*  +β2*  
+ β3 *   + β4*IND1 + β5*IND2 + β6*IND3 + β7*IND4+ 
β8*IND5 + β9*IND6+ β10*IND7 + β11*IND8 + β12*IND9+ β13 * 
 
 
 = α + β1*  
+β2*  + β3 *   + β4*IND1 + β5*IND2 
+ β6*IND3 + β7*IND4+ β8*IND5 + β9*IND6+ β10*IND7 + β11*IND8 + β12*IND9 
+ β13 *  
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Table 7 – Results for the first econometrical model (2SLS approach) – Equation 1 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Equation 1 
(Average leverage after 
the reform) B. Std. Error 
Beta T Sig. 
(Constant) -.056 .051   -1.110 .267 
TangibilityBR                 .102 .009 .103 11.842 .000 
FirmSizeBR                    .044 .001 .301 34.955 .000 
ProfitabilityBR               -.168 .011 -.129 -15.509 .000 
OwnershipConcAfter
Reform                            
.021 .006 .029 3.396 .001 
Industry dummies Yes 
 
From the above table, it is noticed that all the four explanatory variables (average 
tangibility before the reform, average firm size before the reform, average 
profitability before the reform and average ownership concentration after the 
reform) are significant.  
The estimated unstandardized coefficients B show the predicted change in the 
dependant variable when the explanatory variable is increased by one unit 
conditional on all the other variables in the model remaining constant.  
 
Provided that the firms have constant values for all the other variables in the 
model, the average profitability before the reform has the biggest impact (-0.168) 
on the average leverage after the reform while the average ownership 
concentration after the reform has the smallest impact (0.021) on the average 
leverage after the reform. 
 
The negative relationship between the average leverage and average profitability 
supports the predictions of the pecking order theory. On the other hand, the 
positive relationship between average leverage and average ownership 
concentration contradicts the predictions of Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency 
theory of capital structure. However, this positive relationship can be explained by 
the role that the firm control may play in deciding the financing policy:  firms may 
prefer to issue debt instead of equity if issuing equity means sharing or losing 
control.  
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The positive relationship between average leverage and average tangibility 
supports the trade-off theory. It also supports the pecking order theory if it is 
assumed that “a firm with more assets has a greater worry about the adverse 
selection on those assets” (Frank and Goyal 2009). In addition, the positive 
relationship between average leverage and average firm size also supports the 
predictions of Frank and Goyal (2009). 
 
The standardization of the beta coefficients enables the comparison of effects 
across explanatory variables. The explanatory variable which has the biggest beta 
makes the strongest unique contribution to explaining the dependent variable, 
when the variance explained by all other variables in the model is controlled for. 
Therefore, the set of beta-coefficients suggests that the average firm size before 
the reform has the strongest effect on the average leverage after the reform, after 
adjusting for the effects of other explanatory variables.  
 
Table 8 – Results for the first econometrical model (2SLS approach) – Equation 2 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Equation 2 
(Average ownership 
concentration after the 
reform) 
B. Std. Error 
Beta T Sig. 
(Constant) 1.298 .158   8.233 .000 
FirmSizeBR                    -.166 .010 -.809 -16.317 .000 
ProfitabilityBR               .641 .054 .354 11.908 .000 
LeverageAfterReform     2.790 .227 1.998 12.293 .000 
GrowthOppBR                .000 .003 .001 .058 .954 
Industry dummies Yes 
 
From the above table, it is noticed that three explanatory variables (average firm 
size before the reform, average profitability before the reform, average leverage 
after the reform) are significant. Contrary to the expectations, the average grow 
opportunities before the reform are not significant. 
 
Provided that the firms have constant values for all the other variables in the 
model, the average leverage after the reform has the biggest impact (2.79) on the 
average ownership concentration after the reform while the average firm size 
GRA 19003 Master Thesis                                                                       03.09.2012 
 
Page 28 
 
before the reform has the smallest impact on the average ownership concentration 
after the reform. 
 
The relationship between average leverage and average ownership concentration 
is again positive. The negative relationship between average ownership 
concentration after the reform and average firm size before the reform is in 
accordance with the predictions of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). 
The positive relationship between the average ownership concentration after the 
reform and the average profitability before the reform contradicts the findings of 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001).  An explanation for this positive relationship can 
be that private owners are so attached to their family businesses that they do not 
want to lose the control of their companies by selling shares or maybe that the 
investors do not want to invest in these private firms even if they are profitable. 
   
The set of beta-coefficients suggests that the average leverage after the reform has 
the strongest effect on the average ownership concentration after the reform, after 
adjusting for the effects of other explanatory variables.  
 
Since the average leverage after the reform has the strongest effect on the average 
ownership concentration after the reform while the average ownership 
concentration after the reform has the weakest effect on the average leverage after 
the reform, it can be concluded that the average leverage impacts more the 
average ownership concentration than the other way around.  
 
5.2 Second econometrical model 
 
The second econometrical model assesses the impact of the average firm 
characteristics before the reform on the change in leverage and on the change in 
ownership concentration between 2004 and 2005. It takes a short-term perspective 
since 2005 is the first year in which the reform effects started to be noticed. This 
model uses cross-sectional variables where each of the 23899 cross sections 
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corresponds to a firm from Sample 3.  The results for this econometrical model 
are shown in Table 9 and Table 10. (Appendix 5) 
 
=α+β1*  +β2*  
+ β3 *   + β4*IND1 + β5*IND2 + β6*IND3 + β7*IND4+ 
β8*IND5 + β9*IND6+ β10*IND7 + β11*IND8 + β12*IND9 + β13 * 
 
 
= α + 
β1*  +β2*  + β3 * 
  + β4*IND1 + β5*IND2 + β6*IND3 + β7*IND4+ β8*IND5 + 
β9*IND6+ β10*IND7 + β11*IND8 + β12*IND9+ β13 *   
 
Table 9 – Results for the second econometrical model (2SLS approach) – Equation 1 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Equation 1 
(Change in leverage) 
B. Std. Error 
Beta T Sig. 
(Constant) -.007 .028   -.248 .804 
TangibilityBR                      .031 .005 .037 5.815 .000 
FirmSizeBR                         .004 .001 .038 6.104 .000 
ProfitabilityBR                    -.432 .007 -.398 -65.604 .000 
ChangeInOwnershipConc   .017 .008 .013 2.084 .037 
Industry dummies Yes 
 
From the above table, it is noticed that all the four explanatory variables (average 
tangibility before the reform, average firm size before the reform, average 
profitability before the reform and change in ownership concentration) are 
significant.  
 
Provided that the firms have constant values for all the other variables in the 
model, the average profitability before the reform has the biggest impact (-0.432) 
 
GRA 19003 Master Thesis                                                                       03.09.2012 
 
Page 30 
 
on the change in leverage. The average firm size before the reform has the 
smallest impact (0.004) on the change in leverage. 
 
The negative relationship between the change in leverage and average profitability 
before the reform supports the pecking order theory. The relationship between the 
change in leverage and the average firm size before the reform is positive as well 
as the relationship between the change in leverage and the average tangibility 
before the reform. The relationship between the change in leverage and the change 
in ownership concentration is positive meaning that a change in the ownership 
concentration triggers a change in leverage also. 
 
The set of beta-coefficients suggests that the average profitability before the 
reform has the strongest effect on the change in leverage, after adjusting for the 
effects of other explanatory variables.  
 
Table 10 – Results for the second econometrical model (2SLS approach) – Equation 2 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Equation 2 
(Change in ownership 
concentration) B. Std. Error 
Beta T Sig. 
(Constant) -.079 .133   -.594 .552 
FirmSizeBR                       -.010 .004 -.116 -2.470 .014 
ProfitabilityBR                  2.022 .265 2.570 7.645 .000 
ChangeInLeverage            4.571 .603 6.304 7.584 .000 
GrowthOppBR                  -.015 .003 -.247 -4.930 .000 
Industry dummies Yes 
 
From the above table, it is noticed that four explanatory variables (average firm 
size before the reform, average profitability before the reform, change in leverage, 
average grow opportunities before the reform) are significant.  
 
Provided that the firms have constant values for all the other variables in the 
model, the change in leverage has the biggest impact (4.571) on the change in 
ownership concentration. The average firm size before the reform has the smallest 
impact on the change in ownership concentration. 
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The relationship between the change in leverage and the change in ownership 
concentration is positive.  The relationship between the change in ownership 
concentration and the average firm size before the reform is negative. There is a 
positive relationship between the change in ownership concentration and the 
average profitability before the reform. 
 
There is a negative relationship between the change in ownership concentration 
and average growth opportunities before the reform. This finding contradicts the 
initial prediction that there is a positive relationship between them.  According to 
Iancu and Radulescu (2011), this negative relationship can be explained by the 
fact that growth opportunities may be associated with better performance, which 
may increase the investors’ interest in the company, thus making it possible for 
the ownership concentration to decrease as the existing shareholders sell part of 
their shares to the investors 
. 
The set of beta-coefficients suggests that the change in leverage after the reform 
has the strongest effect on the change in ownership concentration after the reform, 
after adjusting for the effects of other explanatory variables. 
 
Since the change in leverage after the reform has the strongest effect on the 
change in ownership concentration after the reform while the change in ownership 
concentration after the reform has the weakest effect on the change in leverage 
after the reform, it can be concluded that the change in leverage impacts more the 
change in ownership concentration than the other way around.  
 
As a conclusion of the first two econometrical models, the effect is stronger from 
leverage to ownership concentration than from ownership concentration to 
leverage no matter if it is considered the change or the average in the respective 
variables. In addition, the sign of the relationship between leverage and ownership 
concentration stays constant. Also the signs of the relationships between 
tangibility, firm size, profitability and leverage stay constant as well as the signs 
between firm size, profitability and ownership concentration. The negative sign 
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between grow opportunities and ownership concentration is significant only in the 
second econometrical model.   
5.3 Third econometrical model 
 
The third econometrical model looks at the effect of the tax reform (using the 
Time dummy variable) and the firm characteristics on the levels of leverage and 
ownership concentration. This model uses the balanced panel data from Sample 2 
which has 13606 cross sections for 10 years. The results for this econometrical 
model are shown in Table 11 and Table 12. (Appendix 6) 
 
Leverage = α + β1* Tangibility + β2* Profitability + β3 * Firm size + β4*IND1 + 
β5*IND2 + β6*IND3 + β7*IND4+ β8*IND5 + β9*IND6+ β10*IND7 + β11*IND8 + 
β12*IND9+ β13 * Ownership concentration + β14 * Time 
 
Ownership concentration= α + β1* Profitability + β2 * Firm size + β3 *Growth 
opportunities + β4*IND1 + β5*IND2 + β6*IND3 + β7*IND4+ β8*IND5 + 
β9*IND6+ β10*IND7 + β11*IND8 + β12*IND9 + β13*Leverage + β14 * Time 
 
Table 11: Results for the third econometrical model (2SLS approach) – Leverage as 
dependent variable (Sample 2) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.045096 0.007519 -5.997244 0.0000
TANGIBIL 0.126429 0.002755 45.88291 0.0000
PROFITAB -0.006539 0.002853 -2.291866 0.0219
FIRMSIZE 0.045364 0.000411 110.4464 0.0000
OWNERCO 0.050480 0.002044 24.69475 0.0000
TIME -0.110905 0.001117 -99.25343 0.0000
INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES Yes 
 
From the above table, it is noticed that all the five explanatory variables of the 
endogenous variable leverage are significant. In comparison with the previous two 
econometrical models, there are maintained the positive relationships between 
tangibility and leverage, firm size and leverage as well as ownership concentration 
and leverage.  
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Provided that the firms have constant values for all the other variables in the 
model, tangibility has the biggest impact (0.126) on leverage. Ownership 
concentration had the third biggest impact (0.05) on leverage. 
 
The significance of the dummy variable Time proves that the tax reform did have 
a negative impact on leverage, more specifically the second biggest impact (-0.11) 
after tangibility. Thus, leverage decreased following the tax reform and this can 
also be seen from Table 6.  
  
Contrary to the findings from the above two econometrical model where average 
profitability had the biggest impact on the change in leverage and the average 
leverage after the reform, this model shows that profitability has the smallest 
impact on leverage. However, all three econometrical models show that there is a 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
 
Table 12: Results for the third econometrical model (2SLS approach) –Ownership 
concentration as dependent variable (Sample 2) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.095441 0.032997 33.19802 0.0000
GROWOPP 0.008132 0.001362 5.970229 0.0000
PROFITAB 0.153546 0.012960 11.84767 0.0000
FIRMSIZE -0.232809 0.004149 -56.11718 0.0000
LEVERAGE 4.365767 0.084829 51.46574 0.0000
TIME 0.540515 0.010843 49.84754 0.0000
INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES Yes 
 
From the above table, it is noticed that all the five explanatory variables of the 
endogenous variable ownership concentration are significant. In comparison with 
the previous two econometrical models, there are maintained the positive 
relationships between profitability and ownership concentration, tangibility and 
ownership concentration, leverage and ownership concentration as well as the 
negative relationship between firm size and ownership concentration. The only 
relationship whose sign does not remain unchanged is the one between growth 
opportunities and ownership concentration. This third econometrical model 
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supports the initial prediction that there is a positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and ownership concentration. 
 
Provided that the firms have constant values for all the other variables in the 
model, leverage has the biggest impact (4.365) on ownership concentration.  
The significance of the dummy variable Time proves that the tax reform did have 
an impact on ownership concentration, more specifically the second biggest 
impact (0.54) after leverage. Thus, ownership concentration increased following 
the tax reform and this can also be seen from Table 6.   
 
In accordance with the findings of the previous two econometrical models, the 
third econometrical model shows that the effect is stronger from leverage to 
ownership concentration than from ownership concentration to leverage. 
6. Conclusions 
 
All the three econometrical models showed that there is a bidirectional positive 
relationship between leverage and ownership concentration and that leverage’s 
effect on ownership concentration is bigger than the ownership concentration’s 
effect on leverage. This positive relationship contradicts the prediction of the 
agency theory of capital structure but it can be explained by the role that the firm 
control may play in deciding the financing policy:  firms may prefer to issue debt 
instead of equity if issuing equity means sharing or losing control.  
 
The third econometrical model proved that the tax reform had a negative impact 
on leverage and a positive impact on ownership concentration. The size of the 
impact is ranked as the second highest for both equations. In addition, the tests 
conducted for the mean and median showed that there is a significant difference 
between the leverage before and after the tax reform as well as between the 
ownership concentration before and after the tax reform. 
 
All the three models proved that the relationships between profitability and 
ownership concentration, tangibility and ownership concentration are positive 
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while the relationship between firm size and ownership concentration is negative. 
In addition, the relationships between tangibility and leverage, firm size and 
leverage are positive while the relationship between profitability and leverage is 
negative. All the signs of these relationships are in accordance with the ones 
predicted by the theory with the exception of the relationship between profitability 
and ownership concentration.  
 
The only relationship that changes signs between the models is the one between 
growth opportunities and ownership concentration. This third econometrical 
model supports the initial prediction that there is a positive relationship between 
growth opportunities and ownership concentration while the second econometrical 
model shows a negative relationship. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Previous rules (1992 Tax reform) vs. New rules (2006 Tax reform) 
 
Previous rules New rules 
Share income earned by Norwegian personal shareholders 
Share dividends from Norwegian 
companies: 
In principle taxable, but full imputation 
means that in practice dividends are not 
taxed in the hands of the shareholder. 
 
Share dividends from foreign company:  
Fully taxable, deduction in Norwegian tax 
for tax at source on dividends paid to the 
state in which the company is resident. 
 
Active shareholders are additionally taxed 
according to the split income model, with 
progressive tax (National Insurance 
contributions and surtax) on an estimated 
share of the company’s profit attributable 
to labour, irrespective of whether the profit 
was distributed as dividend or not. 
 
Capital gains on shares are always taxable 
income, and losses on shares are 
deductible. 
 
When gain or loss on shares is calculated, 
income that was taxed in the company 
during the shareholder's ownership period 
is credited to the shareholder through the 
RISK rules 
(opening value adjustment). This 
adjustment ensures that the portion of the 
gains that is due to retained profits is not 
taxed. RISK is only applied to shares in 
Norwegian companies. 
The shareholder model: Share dividends 
in excess of the allowance for a computed 
risk-free return are taxable. The imputation 
rules are abolished. 
 
The shareholder model applies only to 
dividends from companies resident in 
Norway or another EEA country. 
 
Dividends from companies resident in 
nonEEA countries will be taxable as 
before, i.e. fully taxable, but with 
deduction in Norwegian tax for taxation at 
source. 
 
The split income model is abolished for 
active shareholders. The new rules do not 
distinguish between active and passive 
shareholders. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2006.  
A transitional rule for 2005 introduced the 
same right to imputation for dividends 
from companies in 
EEA countries as for dividends from 
Norwegian limited companies. 
 
Capital gain on shares is always taxable, 
and loss on shares is always deductible. 
 
The RISK rules are abolished. Unused 
riskfree return allowance reduces capital 
gains, but cannot be used to increase a loss. 
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Previous rules New rules 
Share income accrued by Norwegian limited companies 
Dividends, capital gains and losses are 
treated as described above for personal 
shareholders. 
The exemption method: Share dividend 
and capital gains on shares are exempt 
from tax. Conversely, losses on shares are 
not deductible. 
 
The exemption method does not apply to: 
 shares in companies in lowtax 
nonEEA countries 
 portfolio shares (i.e. in cases of a less than 
10 per cent holding) in companies in 
nonEEA countries 
 
For these shares, dividends and capital gain 
on shares are still taxable and losses on 
shares are deductible. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2004 for 
dividends and 26 March 2004 for capital 
gains and losses on shares. 
 
Previous rules New rules 
Share dividends from Norwegian limited companies to foreign 
shareholders 
Obligation to pay tax at source to Norway 
on dividends. The tax rate is 25 per cent at 
the outset, but has been reduced in a 
number of tax agreements into which 
Norway has entered with other states. 
If the foreign shareholder is a limited 
company resident in an EEA country, the 
exemption method applies. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2004. 
 
Personal shareholders resident in another 
EEA country are taxed according to the 
shareholder model in the same way as 
Norwegian personal shareholders. For 
shareholders outside the EEA (both 
personal and corporate) the tax at source 
rules apply as previously. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2004.  
Under a transitional rule, these 
shareholders were exempt from tax at 
source in 2005. 
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Previous rules New rules 
General partnerships, limited partnerships and other partnerships 
The company’s profits are taxed on an 
accrual basis as ordinary income in the 
hands of partners. 
 
Active partners are additionally taxed 
according to the split income model, with 
progressive tax (National Insurance 
contributions and surtax) on an estimated 
share of the company’s profit attributable 
to labor, regardless of whether the profit 
was distributed to partners or not. 
The company’s profits are taxed on an 
accrual basis as ordinary income in the 
hands of partners. 
 
The partnership model: When corporate 
profits are distributed to personal partners, 
the part that exceeds a computed riskfree 
return on the investment is additionally 
taxed as ordinary income. 
 
The split income model is abolished for 
active partners. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2006 
 
Previous rules New rules 
Selfemployed (sole proprietorships) 
The profits are taxed on an accrual basis as 
ordinary income in the hands of the owner. 
 
Active owners are additionally taxed 
according to the split income model with a 
progressive tax (National Insurance 
contributions and surtax) on a computed 
share of the company’s profits attributable 
to labor. 
The profits are taxed on an accrual basis as 
ordinary income in the hands of the owner. 
 
The selfemployed model: The owner is 
additionally subject to a progressive tax 
(National Insurance contributions and 
surtax) on accrued profits after deduction 
of a computed riskfree return on the 
capital. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2006 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Report No. 11 to the Storting: “Evaluation of the 
2006 Tax Reform” 
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Appendix 2: Variables table 
 
 Item number Item name 
1 9 Revenue 
2 19 Results of operations 
3 51 Tangible fixed assets 
4 78 Current assets 
5 87 Equity 
6 93 +94+ 98 Bonds + Liabilities to financial institutions (long term) 
+ Other long-term liabilities 
7 101 Liabilities to financial institutions (short term) 
8 102 Trade creditors 
9 105 Dividends 
10 109 Current liabilities 
11 124 NOR Kontantstrøm (CF) 
12 11103 Industry codes at level two 
13 13420 Company age 
14 13501 First rating date 
15 219 Aggregated fraction held by personal owners 
16 231 Largest owner is institutional 
17 13601 Share owned by CEO 
18 14011 Sum % Equity held by owner with rank 1 
19 14025 Herfindahl 
20 30 Other interest expenses 
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Appendix 3: Firms’ classification into 9 industry sectors using the NAIC codes 
 
NAICS 
code 
NAICS  label Industry 
sector 
code 
Industry sector 
1  Agriculture and hunting  1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining  
2  Forestry and logging  1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining  
5  Fishing, fish farming, incl. 
services  
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining  
10  Coal mining and peat extraction  1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining  
12  Mining of uranium and thorium 
ores  
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining  
13  Mining of metal ores  1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining  
14  Other mining and quarrying  1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining  
27  Basic metals  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
28  Fabricated metal products  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
29  Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
30  Office machinery and computers  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
31  Electrical machinery and 
apparatus  
2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
32  Radio, TV sets, communication 
equip  
2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
26  Other non-metallic mineral 
products  
2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
34  Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-tr.  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
21  Pulp, paper and paper products  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
33  Instruments, watches and clocks  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
25  Rubber and plastic products  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
24  Chemicals and chemical products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
35  Other transport equipment  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
22  Publishing, printing, reproduction 2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
36  Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c.  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
20  Wood and wood products  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
19  Footwear and leather products  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
18  Wearing apparel., fur  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
17  Textile products  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
16  Tobacco products  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
15  Food products and beverages  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
23  Refined petroleum products  2 Manufacturing, chemical products  
40  Electricity, gas and steam supply  3 Energy  
11  Oil and gas extraction, incl. serv.  3 Energy  
45  Construction  4 Construction  
91  Membership organizations n.e.c.  5 Service  
74  Other business activities  5 Service  
73  Research and development  5 Service  
72  Computers and related activities  5 Service  
71  Renting of machinery and 
equipment  
5 Service  
37  Recycling  5 Service  
80  Education  5 Service  
99  Extra-territorial org. and bodies  5 Service  
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85  Health and social work  5 Service  
75  Public administration and defense 5 Service  
90  Sewage, refuse disposal activities  5 Service  
70  Real estate activities  5 Service  
92  Cultural and sporting activities  5 Service  
55  Hotels and restaurants  5 Service  
93  Other service activities  5 Service  
95  Domestic services  5 Service  
50  Motor vehicle services  5 Service  
41  Water supply  5 Service  
64  Post and telecommunications  5 Service  
66  Insurance and pension funding  6 Financial  
65  Financial intermediation, less ins. 6 Financial  
67  Auxiliary financial intermediation 6 Financial  
52  Retail trade, repair personal 
goods  
7 Trade  
51  Wholesale trade, commission 
trade  
7 Trade  
63  Supporting transport activities  8 Transport  
62  Air transport  8 Transport  
61  Water transport  8 Transport  
60  Land transport, pipeline transport  8 Transport  
  9 Multisector  
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Appendix 4: Full results for the first econometrical model 
 
Model Description 
 
Type of Variable 
LeverageAfterReform                 Dependent 
TangibilityBR                              predictor & instrumental 
FirmSizeBR                                 predictor & instrumental 
ProfitabilityBR                            predictor & instrumental 
IND1                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND2                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND3                                           predictor & instrumental 
IND4                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND5                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND6                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND7                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND8                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND9                                            predictor & instrumental 
OwnershipConcAfterReform      Predictor 
GrowthOppBR                            Instrumental 
Equation 1 
HerfindahlAR                              Instrumental 
OwnershipConcAfterReform      Dependent 
LeverageAfterReform                 Predictor 
GrowthOppBR                            predictor & instrumental 
FirmSizeBR                                 predictor & instrumental 
ProfitabilityBR                            predictor & instrumental 
IND1                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND2                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND3                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND4                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND5                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND6                                           predictor & instrumental 
IND7                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND8                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND9                                           predictor & instrumental 
TangibilityBR                              Instrumental 
Equation 2 
HerfindahlAR                              Instrumental 
MOD_1                                                            
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Model Summary 
Multiple R .341
R Square .116
Adjusted R Square .115
Equation 1 
Std. Error of the Estimate .176
Multiple R .156
R Square .024
Adjusted R Square .023
Equation 2 
Std. Error of the Estimate .553
 
 
ANOVA 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 55.570 13 4.275 137.332 .000
Residual 423.067 13592 .031   
Equation 1 
Total 478.637 13605    
Regression 103.746 13 7.980 26.074 .000
Residual 4160.152 13592 .306   
Equation 2 
Total 4263.899 13605    
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Coefficients 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients  
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.056 .051   -1.110 .267
TangibilityBR         .102 .009 .103 11.842 .000
FirmSizeBR            .044 .001 .301 34.955 .000
ProfitabilityBR       -.168 .011 -.129 -15.509 .000
IND1                       -.031 .049 -.021 -.640 .522
IND2                       -.016 .047 -.028 -.346 .730
IND3                       .003 .061 .001 .045 .964
IND4                       .033 .047 .065 .691 .489
IND5                       .019 .047 .047 .394 .694
IND6                       .010 .066 .002 .146 .884
IND7                      .017 .047 .040 .366 .715
IND8                       .021 .048 .025 .449 .654
IND9                       -.009 .048 -.010 -.198 .843
Equation 1 
OwnershipConcAf
terReform                
.021 .006 .029 3.396 .001
(Constant) 1.298 .158   8.233 .000
FirmSizeBR            -.166 .010 -.809 -16.317 .000
ProfitabilityBR        .641 .054 .354 11.908 .000
IND1                       .082 .153 .040 .538 .591
IND2                       .075 .149 .090 .501 .616
IND3                       -.163 .191 -.024 -.851 .395
IND4                       -.014 .149 -.020 -.092 .926
IND5                       .000 .148 .000 .001 .999
IND6                       .157 .206 .020 .765 .444
IND7                       .089 .148 .148 .598 .550
IND8                       -.025 .150 -.020 -.164 .870
IND9                       .098 .150 .073 .655 .513
LeverageAfterRef
orm                          
2.790 .227 1.998 12.293 .000
Equation 2 
GrowthOppBR        .000 .003 .001 .058 .954
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Appendix 5: Full results for the second econometrical model 
 
Model Description 
 
Type of Variable 
ChangeInLeverage                      Dependent 
TangibilityBR                              predictor & instrumental 
FirmSizeBR                                 predictor & instrumental 
ProfitabilityBR                            predictor & instrumental 
IND1                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND2                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND3                                           predictor & instrumental 
IND4                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND5                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND6                                           predictor & instrumental 
IND7                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND8                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND9                                            predictor & instrumental 
ChangeInOwnershipConc           Predictor 
GrowthOppBR                            Instrumental 
Equation 1 
ChangeInHerfindahl                    Instrumental 
ChangeInOwnershipConc           Dependent 
ChangeInLeverage                      Predictor 
GrowthOppBR                            predictor & instrumental 
FirmSizeBR                                 predictor & instrumental 
ProfitabilityBR                            predictor & instrumental 
IND1                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND2                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND3                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND4                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND5                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND6                                           predictor & instrumental 
IND7                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND8                                            predictor & instrumental 
IND9                                           predictor & instrumental 
TangibilityBR                              Instrumental 
Equation 2 
ChangeInHerfindahl                    Instrumental 
MOD_4                                                            
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Model Summary 
Multiple R .413
R Square .170
Adjusted R Square .170
Equation 1 
Std. Error of the Estimate .147
Multiple R .050
R Square .003
Adjusted R Square .002
Equation 2 
Std. Error of the Estimate .681
 
 
ANOVA 
 
Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Regression 106.100 13 8.162 376.801 .000
Residual 517.350 23885 .022   
Equation 1 
Total 623.450 23898    
Regression 27.938 13 2.149 4.629 .000
Residual 11089.257 23885 .464   
Equation 2 
Total 11117.195 23898    
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Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients  
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.007 .028   -.248 .804
TangibilityBR   .031 .005 .037 5.815 .000
FirmSizeBR     .004 .001 .038 6.104 .000
ProfitabilityB
R                       
-.432 .007 -.398 -65.604 .000
IND1                 -.092 .028 -.075 -3.314 .001
IND2                 -.093 .027 -.180 -3.428 .001
IND3                 -.083 .036 -.021 -2.313 .021
IND4                 -.089 .027 -.198 -3.278 .001
IND5                 -.101 .027 -.298 -3.743 .000
IND6                 -.163 .037 -.037 -4.362 .000
IND7                -.084 .027 -.232 -3.125 .002
IND8                 -.084 .027 -.111 -3.094 .002
IND9                 -.089 .027 -.111 -3.264 .001
Equation 1 
ChangeInOwn
ershipConc        
.017 .008 .013 2.084 .037
(Constant) -.079 .133   -.594 .552
FirmSizeBR      -.010 .004 -.116 -2.470 .014
ProfitabilityB
R                       
2.022 .265 2.570 7.645 .000
IND1                 .359 .138 .400 2.595 .009
IND2                 .385 .136 1.032 2.827 .005
IND3                 .343 .171 .118 1.999 .046
IND4                 .378 .135 1.169 2.793 .005
IND5                 .438 .138 1.786 3.165 .002
IND6                 .732 .200 .229 3.669 .000
IND7                 .375 .135 1.422 2.773 .006
IND8                 .338 .135 .612 2.514 .012
IND9                 .380 .137 .652 2.781 .005
ChangeInLeve
rage                   
4.571 .603 6.304 7.584 .000
Equation 2 
GrowthOppB
R                       
-.015 .003 -.247 -4.930 .000
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Appendix 6: Full results for the third econometrical model 
 
Dependent Variable: LEVERAGE   
Method: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 01/08/12   Time: 12:12   
Sample: 2000 2009   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 13606  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 136060  
Instrument specification: C TANGIBIL PROFITAB FIRMSIZE IND1 IND2 
        IND3 IND4 IND5 IND6 IND7 IND8 IND9 TIME HERFINDA GROWOPP 
Constant added to instrument list  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.045096 0.007519 -5.997244 0.0000 
TANGIBIL 0.126429 0.002755 45.88291 0.0000 
PROFITAB -0.006539 0.002853 -2.291866 0.0219 
FIRMSIZE 0.045364 0.000411 110.4464 0.0000 
IND1 -0.003536 0.005568 -0.635051 0.5254 
IND2 0.010399 0.003930 2.646451 0.0081 
IND3 0.015327 0.011011 1.391913 0.1640 
IND4 0.066313 0.003854 17.20813 0.0000 
IND5 0.045537 0.003710 12.27275 0.0000 
IND6 0.071230 0.014464 4.924511 0.0000 
IND7 0.048055 0.003766 12.76165 0.0000 
IND8 0.037144 0.004002 9.281571 0.0000 
IND9 0.049256 0.004745 10.38007 0.0000 
OWNERCO 0.050480 0.002044 24.69475 0.0000 
TIME -0.110905 0.001117 -99.25343 0.0000 
R-squared 0.155105    Mean dependent var 0.680151 
Adjusted R-squared 0.155018    S.D. dependent var 0.212621 
S.E. of regression 0.195447    Sum squared resid 5196.855 
F-statistic 1808.759    Durbin-Watson stat 0.466949 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Second-Stage SSR 5185.661 
Instrument rank 16    
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Dependent Variable: OWNERCO   
Method: Panel Two-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 01/08/12   Time: 19:21   
Sample: 2000 2009   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 13606  
Total panel (balanced) observations: 136060  
Instrument specification: C TANGIBIL PROFITAB FIRMSIZE IND1 IND2 
        IND3 IND4 IND5 IND6 IND7 IND8 IND9 TIME HERFINDA GROWOPP 
Constant added to instrument list  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1.095441 0.032997 33.19802 0.0000 
GROWOPP 0.008132 0.001362 5.970229 0.0000 
PROFITAB 0.153546 0.012960 11.84767 0.0000 
FIRMSIZE -0.232809 0.004149 -56.11718 0.0000 
IND1 -0.088492 0.025241 -3.505888 0.0005 
IND2 -0.093401 0.017843 -5.234452 0.0000 
IND3 -0.220375 0.049977 -4.409519 0.0000 
IND4 -0.291317 0.018370 -15.85810 0.0000 
IND5 -0.228468 0.017257 -13.23940 0.0000 
IND6 -0.251265 0.065863 -3.814942 0.0001 
IND7 -0.143042 0.017362 -8.238999 0.0000 
IND8 -0.164963 0.018474 -8.929357 0.0000 
IND9 -0.247228 0.021974 -11.25098 0.0000 
LEVERAGE 4.365767 0.084829 51.46574 0.0000 
TIME 0.540515 0.010843 49.84754 0.0000 
R-squared -9.733007    Mean dependent var 0.682657 
Adjusted R-squared -9.734112    S.D. dependent var 0.270735 
S.E. of regression 0.887008    Sum squared resid 107037.9 
F-statistic 3403.228    Durbin-Watson stat 0.436979 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Second-Stage SSR 7386.057 
Instrument rank 16    
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1
1. Introduction to the research topic 
1.1. Tax bases 
 
The Norwegian income tax system operates with two income tax bases: ordinary 
income and personal income. 
 
Ordinary income (alminnelig inntekt) is a net income tax base and it is calculated 
for all taxpayers, both companies and individuals. It includes all taxable income 
from work, business and capital. Tax allowances and reliefs are deductible in the 
computation of ordinary income. The most important of these are interest 
payments on debts and a basic tax allowance on wage and pension income. The 
latter does not, however, apply to wage income from self-employment. In addition 
to the basic tax allowance, travel expenses to and from work exceeding NOK 
12800, trade union fees, gifts to voluntary organizations, documented expenses for 
child care etc. are deductible. (Ministry of Finance)  
 
Personal income (personinntekt) is a gross income tax base which consists of the 
total amount of gross wage and pension income. Social security contributions and 
surtax are levied on personal income. Wage income is a broad term that is defined 
as the sum of wages, income from self-employment that is related to labor input 
and fringe benefits such as company cars, free phone, free stock options etc. In 
general, all kinds of fringe benefits are regarded as personal income. (Ministry of 
Finance) 
 
1.2. 1992 Tax Reform 
 
In 1992 Norway implemented a broad tax reform whose main goal was to reduce 
tax-induced distortions to a minimum by lowering the tax rates and broadening 
the tax base. The reform also involved a significant step towards a more neutral 
tax system with respect to the type of economic activity and the organizational 
and financial structure of such activity. (Ministry of Finance) 
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The dual income tax introduced in 1992 was characterized by a low and flat tax 
rate on capital income and a progressive tax rate on personal income. The basic 
idea was to imply a neutral taxation on capital income and to ensure the 
redistribution of income through the progressive taxation of personal income and 
net wealth.  
The capital income earned by personal tax payers (as well as the one earned by 
corporate tax payers) was subject to a flat tax rate of 28 per cent. The difference in 
marginal tax rates on capital and labor income (including employers’ social 
security contributions) started out at 28,1 percentage points in 1992, increasing to 
36,7 percentage points in 2004. 
The split model was to function as a bridge between these two parts of the tax 
system, by dividing the income from active owners and self employed into capital 
and labor income respectively. This split model implied that a part of the income 
earned by companies owned two-thirds or more by active shareholders, was taxed 
as personal income (which was subject to progressive tax rates), irrespective of 
whether this income was distributed as a dividend or not.  
However, since the 1992 reform, the split model has been changed several times 
with the result that it no longer functioned in a satisfactory manner. 
 
To avoid double taxation, shareholders receiving dividends from Norwegian 
limited companies, were entitled to full credit for tax imposed on the dividends 
(the imputation method). Consequently dividends from Norwegian companies 
were in practice tax free on the hands of the shareholder, ensuring the same total 
taxation of 28 percent upon income earned in a limited company as on other 
capital income. On receiving dividend from a foreign limited company, a personal 
shareholder was not entitled to a full imputation credit, only a tax credit in respect 
of foreign withholding tax. 
 
The 1992 tax reform also introduced a system of annual adjustment of the cost 
base of the shares with the amount of retained taxed profit in the company, to 
avoid economic double taxation of retained earnings, called the RISK-system. The 
adjustment only applied to shares in Norwegian companies. 
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1.3. 2006 Tax Reform 
 
The Norwegian Parliament passed a major tax reform in 2006 which replaced the 
last major Norwegian tax reform from 1992. The main objective of the 2006 tax 
reform was to achieve a more efficient and fair tax system by solving the income 
shifting problem created by the large gap between labor and capital income 
taxation without violating the economic principles of the dual income tax. The 
maximum rate differential between capital income and labor income was 33.5 
percentage points in 2005 and this led the owners of small companies to paying 
their salaries as dividends by reclassifying labor income as capital income. 
(Ministry of Finance 2005) 
 
The challenge of the 2006 reform was to eliminate the gap in the marginal tax 
rates and abolish the split model without violating tax neutrality of financing 
decisions, and without increasing the corporate income tax. The only realistic way 
to reduce the gap in the marginal tax rates was to combine a reduction in the 
marginal tax rates on labor with an introduction of a partial double taxation of 
dividends paid to individual shareholders. (by eliminating the former imputation 
system). To maintain neutrality, the dividend tax was equipped with an allowance 
for the cost of capital (as well as ordinary loss deductions), the so called 
shareholder model. The same principle was introduced in the taxation of sole 
proprietors and partnerships. (Ministry of Finance 2011) 
 
The main element of the 2006 tax reform was to replace the split model and the 
imputation system with the shareholder model. 
Norwegian Individual Shareholders are taxable for capital gains on the realization 
of shares and have a corresponding right to deduct losses. Capital gains are taxed 
as ordinary income with a flat tax rate of 28%. 
Also, the dividends exceeding a risk-free return on the investment are taxed as 
ordinary income with a flat tax rate of 28%. Before the dividends distribution, the 
company has paid the ordinary 28% corporate tax on the operating profits, so the 
total maximum marginal tax rate is therefore 48.16 % (28% + (72 x 28%)) for 
distributed dividends. Thus, the dividends that are not exceeding a risk-free return 
on the investment are subject only to the 28% corporate tax on the operating 
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profits. If the dividends for one year are less than the calculated risk-free return on 
investment, the surplus tax free amount can be carried forward in order to be 
offset against dividends distributed in a later year or against any capital gain from 
the alienation of the same share. This risk-free return allowance was intended to 
prevent tax on dividends from raising the costs of funding Norwegian equity and 
it was regarded as particularly important for start-ups and small companies that 
cannot fund new investment with retained profits, or which have limited access to 
credit markets or international capital markets. (Report No. 11 to the Storting) 
 
As a consequence, the gap between labor and capital income has been reduced as 
the income derived from labor and pensions is taxed progressively as personal 
income up to maximum 47.8% on salary. (Albert 2008) The highest marginal tax 
on labor income (including employer’s social security contribution) was thereby 
reduced from 64.7 per cent in 2004 to 54.3 per cent in 2006, 
 
Norwegian Corporate Shareholders are not subject to tax on dividends and on 
capital gains derived from realization of shares in companies which are resident 
within the EEA, while losses suffered from such realization are not tax deductible. 
This method can be applicable to investments in foreign countries outside the 
EEA only if the corporate shareholder holds at least 10% of the shares and voting 
rights for at least 2 years. (Albert 2008) 
 
In addition, the general tax treatment of interest income is that the lender is 
taxable for the received interests with a flat tax rate of 28 %, and the paid interests 
are deductible in ordinary income with the same amount for the borrower. But if 
an individual shareholder lends money to a limited company an additional tax is 
levied, more specifically another 28% on 72 % of the received interest will be 
charged for tax purposes. The reason for this deduction of 28% is symmetry 
considerations towards tax on retained earnings. This means that interests received 
from a limited company are taxed with a total of 48.16 % for amounts exceeding a 
risk-free return and the same as for distributed earnings. (Albert 2008) This 
additional tax charge comes as an addition to the ordinary taxation of the interest 
and thus 172 % of the relevant part of the interest is taxed. (KPMG Tax Facts 
2006) 
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2. Previous rules (1992 Tax reform) vs. New rules (2006 Tax 
reform) 
Previous rules New rules 
Share income earned by Norwegian personal shareholders 
Share dividends from Norwegian 
companies: 
In principle taxable, but full imputation 
means that in practice dividends are not 
taxed in the hands of the shareholder. 
 
Share dividends from foreign 
company:  
Fully taxable, deduction in Norwegian 
tax for tax at source on dividends paid 
to the state in which the company is 
resident. 
 
Active shareholders are additionally 
taxed according to the split income 
model, with progressive tax (National 
Insurance contributions and surtax) on 
an estimated share of the company’s 
profit attributable to labour, irrespective 
of whether the profit was distributed as 
dividend or not. 
 
Capital gains on shares are always 
taxable income, and losses on shares 
are deductible. 
 
When gain or loss on shares is 
calculated, income that was taxed in the 
company during the shareholder's 
The shareholder model: Share 
dividends in excess of the allowance for 
a computed risk-free return are taxable. 
The imputation rules are abolished. 
 
The shareholder model applies only to 
dividends from companies resident in 
Norway or another EEA country. 
 
Dividends from companies resident in 
non‐EEA countries will be taxable as 
before, i.e. fully taxable, but with 
deduction in Norwegian tax for taxation 
at source. 
 
The split income model is abolished for 
active shareholders. The new rules do 
not distinguish between active and 
passive shareholders. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2006.  
A transitional rule for 2005 introduced 
the same right to imputation for 
dividends from companies in 
EEA countries as for dividends from 
Norwegian limited companies. 
 
Capital gain on shares is always 
taxable, and loss on shares is always 
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ownership period is credited to the 
shareholder through the RISK rules 
(opening value adjustment). This 
adjustment ensures that the portion of 
the gains that is due to retained profits 
is not taxed. RISK is only applied to 
shares in Norwegian companies. 
deductible. 
 
The RISK rules are abolished. Unused 
risk‐free return allowance reduces 
capital gains, but cannot be used to 
increase a loss. 
 
Previous rules New rules 
Share income accrued by Norwegian limited companies 
Dividends, capital gains and losses are 
treated as described above for personal 
shareholders. 
The exemption method: Share 
dividend and capital gains on shares are 
exempt from tax. Conversely, losses on 
shares are not deductible. 
 
The exemption method does not apply 
to: 
 shares in companies in low‐tax 
non‐EEA countries 
 portfolio shares (i.e. in cases of a less 
than 10 per cent holding) in companies 
in non‐EEA countries 
 
For these shares, dividends and capital 
gain on shares are still taxable and 
losses on shares are deductible. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2004 for 
dividends and 26 March 2004 for 
capital gains and losses on shares. 
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Previous rules New rules 
Share dividends from Norwegian limited companies to foreign 
shareholders 
Obligation to pay tax at source to 
Norway on dividends. The tax rate is 25 
per cent at the outset, but has been 
reduced in a number of tax agreements 
into which Norway has entered with 
other states. 
If the foreign shareholder is a limited 
company resident in an EEA country, 
the exemption method applies. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2004. 
 
Personal shareholders resident in 
another EEA country are taxed 
according to the shareholder model in 
the same way as Norwegian personal 
shareholders. For shareholders outside 
the EEA (both personal and corporate) 
the tax at source rules apply as 
previously. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2004.  
Under a transitional rule, these 
shareholders were exempt from tax at 
source in 2005. 
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Previous rules New rules 
General partnerships, limited partnerships and other partnerships 
The company’s profits are taxed on an 
accrual basis as ordinary income in the 
hands of partners. 
 
Active partners are additionally taxed 
according to the split income model, 
with progressive tax (National 
Insurance contributions and surtax) on 
an estimated share of the company’s 
profit attributable to labor, regardless of 
whether the profit was distributed to 
partners or not. 
The company’s profits are taxed on an 
accrual basis as ordinary income in the 
hands of partners. 
 
The partnership model: When 
corporate profits are distributed to 
personal partners, the part that exceeds 
a computed risk‐free return on the 
investment is additionally taxed as 
ordinary income. 
 
The split income model is abolished for 
active partners. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2006 
 
Previous rules New rules 
Selfemployed (sole proprietorships) 
The profits are taxed on an accrual 
basis as ordinary income in the hands of 
the owner. 
 
Active owners are additionally taxed 
according to the split income model 
with a progressive tax (National 
Insurance contributions and surtax) on a 
computed share of the company’s 
profits attributable to labor. 
The profits are taxed on an accrual 
basis as ordinary income in the hands of 
the owner. 
 
The selfemployed model: The owner 
is additionally subject to a progressive 
tax (National Insurance contributions 
and surtax) on accrued profits after 
deduction of a computed risk‐free 
return on the capital. 
 
Entry into force: 1 January 2006 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Report No. 11 to the Storting  
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3. Literature review 
 
Alstadsæter & Fjærli (2009) performed a study in which they analyzed the 
dividend policy of 75433 Norwegian non-listed corporations.  Their most 
important finding revealed that the timing of dividend payments was very 
sensitive to changes in the taxation of shareholders and that corporations with 
concentrated ownership had the strongest responses. More specifically, “aggregate 
proposed dividends increased by 82% the last year before the introduction of the 
shareholder income tax and dropped by 41% after the reform”. Moreover, they 
discovered that extraordinarily high dividend payouts compared to after tax profits 
took place. 
 
Another interesting finding was that “the intertemporal income shifting through 
the timing of dividends drains the corporations for internal equity and increases 
their debt-equity ratios”. They also pointed out that there is a clear tendency for 
debt-asset ratios to increase in the years prior to the reform in small corporations 
and in closely held corporations, indicating that internal equity to a large extent 
was replaced by debt. After the reform, it was noticed a sharp drop in dividend 
payments and thus the debt-asset ratio declined. 
 
In addition, there exists the possibility that the tax motivated excessive dividend 
payments could temporarily confine investments if leakage of working capital 
through dividend distributions is not replaced by new funds. Nevertheless, if 
foregone internal funds are replaced by debt or equity, it is less likely that 
intertemporal income shifting have important real effects. In a study performed by 
Mjøs (2008) in which he analyzed the capital structure of Norwegian companies, 
it was found that univariate data actually indicate reduced use of debt in years 
with dividend taxation.  
 
One of the findings of the Myers & Majluf (1984) model is “the tendency to rely 
on internal sources of funds, and to prefer debt to equity if external financing is 
required” when the company’s managers have superior information. They also 
relate “profitability to debt policy through a modified <<pecking order>> 
hypothesis, which suggests that more profitable firms will decrease their demand 
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for debt, since more internal funds will be available to finance investment.” 
(Jensen et al. 1992) 
 
Since limited companies are not taxable for neither received earnings or for 
capital gains, the tax system has built in an important incentive when it comes to 
the type of business entity to choose. Therefore, an increased number of limited 
companies have been established by private investors for the purpose of buying 
and selling shares without taxation through their private limited company. 
Furthermore, there are tax advantages with debt financing compared to retained 
earnings financing because a company will have the possibility to deduct 28 % of 
all interests paid to external lenders.  
 
According to Jensen et al. (1992), “high insider ownership firms choose lower 
levels of both debt and dividends”. Moreover, the firms with “high dividend 
payouts find debt financing less attractive than equity financing”. 
 
4. Research questions and objectives of the thesis 
 
The objective of this thesis is to uncover the main effects of the 2006 Norwegian 
tax reform on the companies’ capital structure. 
This thesis intends to further investigate the following research questions: 
9 Had debt become more attractive as a source of finance after the 
introduction of the double taxation of dividend income? What’s the role of 
retentions as a preferred source of finance? 
9 Does the sharp increase in equity ratios after the reform just reflect the 
timing reflects and turbulence related to the transition or does it also 
involve a permanent change in the funding and payout policy? 
9 Is there a correlation between excess dividend payments and asset growth? 
9 What’s the real purpose of reallocation of dividends from individuals to 
holding companies? Are corporations used as a tax evasion instrument? 
9 The importance of financial slack.  
9 What’s the reform’s effect on the company’s cost of debt? 
9 What’s the effect of the insider ownership on the debt and dividend 
policy? 
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5. Research design and method 
 
Different statistical methods will be used on the sample data obtained from the 
Center for Corporate Governance Research. The research questions will be 
approached by firstly analyzing the previous findings and relevant theory and 
secondly by formulating and testing the hypothesis. 
 
The sample data will consist of independent Norwegian non-listed firms with 
major financial statements data (revenue, results of operations, current liabilities, 
current assets and others) and other non-financial data such as the Herfindahl 
index and ownership structure. 
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